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Abstract 
During the economic crisis, youth unemployment grew exponentially in many European 
countries. It was argued that countries with a high level of firm involvement in the provision 
of initial vocational training were better equipped to address this problem. Boosting 
workplace-based training was therefore seen as the right strategy to tackle unemployment. 
Using Denmark, Spain and the UK as case studies, this article analyses how countries with 
different skill formation systems have improved this type of training. While the UK 
reinforced the voluntaristic character of its training regime, Denmark improved the quality of 
its vocational education, and Spain made reforms to the training and apprenticeship contract. 
Interestingly, the countries achieved different results. To explain this divergence, it is argued 
that while the reforms made in UK and Denmark were compatible with the national 
institutions and coordination mechanisms, this was not the case in Spain, where reforms were 
implemented in a non-complementary way. 
Introduction 
Youth unemployment rose very rapidly in a number of European countries after the onset of 
the global economic crisis in 2008 (Marques & Salavisa, 2017; Tosun, Unt, & Wadensjo, 
2017). Southern Europe and Ireland were the most severely affected, but some other countries 
were able to prevent this situation. For instance, in Spain the youth unemployment rate (15–
24 years old) rose from 24.5% in 2008 to 55.5% in 2013; in Austria it increased slightly from 
8.5% to 9.7% in the same period; and in Germany it decreased from 10.6% to 7.8% (Eurostat, 
2018). The impact of the sovereign debt crisis in Europe helps explain these differences, as 
Southern European countries and Ireland were more severely affected than other European 
countries. However, the above data also reveal that there were already differences before the 
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crisis; namely, youth unemployment rates were already higher in Southern Europe. A more 
detailed analysis of these data shows that youth unemployment rates were lower in countries 
with a collective skill formation regime, i.e., those with a high level of firm involvement in 
the provision of initial vocational training and a strong public commitment to vocational 
training (Busemeyer & Trampusch, 2012). Indeed, Germany, Netherlands, Switzerland, 
Austria and Denmark had much lower youth unemployment rates, as shown in Figure 1 
(Biavaschi et al., 2012; Brzinsky-Fay, 2017; Busemeyer & Iversen, 2012; Busemeyer & 
Thelen, 2015).  
Figure 1 to feature here 
As a consequence, during the economic crisis, many authors and organisations 
claimed that reforms should be made in training and educational systems, notably in those 
countries that were facing growing youth unemployment levels (Biavaschi et al., 2012; 
Eichhorst, Rodríguez-Planas, Schmidl, & Zimmermann, 2015; Lodovici et al., 2013). In the 
European Union (EU), several initiatives were implemented to fight youth unemployment. A 
number of EU policy measures referred to the need for higher investment in apprenticeships 
and vocational training, the most important of which was the Youth Guarantee implemented 
in 2013 (Chabanet, 2014; Lahusen, Schulz, & Graziano, 2013; Tosun, 2017; Tosun & 
Horisch, 2018; Tosun, Treib & De Francesco, 2019). The Youth Guarantee called on member 
states to implement measures that would ensure that young people would get a ‘good quality’ 
offer of a job, a traineeship, an apprenticeship or continued education, within four months of 
becoming unemployed or leaving education. In the scope of these initiatives, the EU 
emphasised the need for greater collaboration between employers and the educational system, 
on the one hand, and among social partners, on the other. For example, the EU’s Youth 
Guarantee encouraged countries to:  
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… strengthen partnerships between employers and relevant labour market players 
(employment services, various levels of government, trade unions and youth services) 
in order to boost employment, apprenticeship and traineeship opportunities for young 
people’ (European Council, 2013, p. 4).  
In the field of comparative political economy, several authors have argued that 
countries have divergent skill formation systems (Busemeyer & Trampusch, 2012; Hall & 
Soskice, 2001; Thelen, 2004). They argued that Coordinated Market Economies (CMEs) tend 
to invest more on specific skills and therefore on their Vocational Education and Training 
(VET) system, whereas Liberal Market Economies (LMEs) invest more on general skills and 
consequently on their tertiary education system. They explained the differences between 
CMEs and LMEs by the role played by macro institutions (systems of industrial relations, 
labour market legislation and the welfare state). This led us to the research puzzle of our 
study: Given that skill formation systems differ across countries and that some institutions 
need to be in place before there can be greater firm involvement, one would expect it to be 
very difficult to successfully promote partnerships between social partners that boost 
apprenticeship and traineeship opportunities in the absence of these institutions. 
Notwithstanding, differences have been found among countries that lack these institutions. In 
Spain, for instance, workplace-based training did not increase between 2008 and 2015 
whereas in the United Kingdom the number of students attending this type of training did 
increase.  
The research question of this article is twofold: Did countries adopt different strategies 
to boost workplace-based training between 2008 and 2015; and if this was the case, why were 
some countries more successful than others? The article addresses this research question by 
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first analysing how countries with different skill formation systems boosted firm-based 
training; it then assesses the relative success of each country. Three typical case studies – 
Denmark, Spain and United Kingdom (UK) – are compared, showing that between 2008 and 
2015, these countries made reforms with the aim of increasing firm-based training. However, 
we also show that these reforms have not been homogenous, which explains their varying 
success in boosting workplace-based training.  
This article begins by reviewing the literature that discusses the linkages between 
institutions, coordination mechanisms and skill formation systems. The theoretical argument 
of the study is then presented and three hypotheses are put forward. This is followed by the 
methods and data section before presenting a comparative analysis of the three case studies. 
The article concludes with a brief summary and critique of the findings. 
Institutions, coordination and skill formation systems 
There is a vast literature on the linkages between institutions, coordination mechanisms and 
skill formation systems (Busemeyer & Trampusch, 2012; Estevez-Abe, Iversen, & Soskice, 
2001; Streeck, 1992a,b; Thelen, 2004). The Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) literature plays a 
crucial role in this debate; the differences between LMEs and CMEs are important to explain 
the differences between skill formation systems (Hall & Soskice, 2001). It is well known that 
strategic coordination prevails in CMEs and that market coordination plays the major role in 
LMEs. Strategic interaction refers to situations where actors are aware of their 
interdependence and all of them try to anticipate the choices of the other parties when making 
a decision, in the knowledge that the others will do the same (Hall & Taylor, 1996). The VoC 
literature argues that certain institutions ‘allow’ this interaction to take place because they 
‘structure the courses of action that a set of actors may choose’ (Scharpf, 1997, p. 38); 
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institutions provide information and reduce uncertainty. Market coordination means that 
coordination among different actors takes place through market mechanisms. Similarly, 
institutions must be in place to allow this interaction to take place so that market mechanisms 
can work freely. According to the VoC literature, strategic coordination is important for a high 
investment in specific skills to take place, while market coordination is crucial for a high 
investment in general skills to occur.   
 Given that our analysis is focused on workplace-based training, it is necessary to 
clarify how these linkages work in the case of high investment in specific skills, i.e., why 
certain institutions are crucial for sustaining this type of investment. The following three types 
of macro institutions support high investment in initial VET: industrial relations systems, 
labour market legislation and the welfare state. According to the VoC literature, a high level of 
coordination in the industrial relations system is important to allow firms to invest in their 
employees’ specific skills because it reduces the risk of poaching (i.e., the luring of skilled 
employees over to other firms by offering higher wages) (Thelen, 2004). When wages are set 
through collective agreements, this risk is much lower. Labour market legislation is important 
for employees: They tend to invest more in specific skills if there is a lower risk of dismissal, 
because specific skills can be used in a particular firm or sector but not in the external market. 
Thus, the higher the level of employment protection, the more willing workers are to invest in 
firm-specific training (Busemeyer & Thelen, 2015; Estevez-Abe et al., 2001). As for the 
welfare state, Estevez-Abe et al. (2001) argued that if unemployment benefits were generous, 
workers would be more prone to invest in firm-specific training because it would allow them 
to turn down job offers from a different industry and because it would help to keep wages 
high in periods of high unemployment.  
Some countries, however, have a more hybrid system where institutional 
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complementarities are weaker. The French case is a good example; it does not have the same 
cooperative relations between labour and capital as do other countries in Continental Europe 
(Crouch, 1993), and the state tends to play a very central role. France shares important 
characteristics with other Mediterranean countries (Spain, Portugal, Italy and Greece), so it is 
not by chance that Hall and Soskice (2001) included it in the Mediterranean group. In the 
field of comparative political economy, scholars speak of a different model − Mixed Market 
Economies (MMEs). This is a hybrid model in which the state plays a crucial coordination 
role (Molina & Rhodes, 2007). Due to the lack of strategic and market coordination, the state 
resolves coordination problems in these political economies. Historically, MMEs have 
combined a high level of employment protection (at least since the early 1970s) and a low 
level of coordination in the industrial relations system (Marques & Salavisa, 2017). MMEs 
also have a more generous welfare state than do LMEs. 
As a consequence, MMEs do not have a high investment in workplace-based training 
because they lack institutional complementarities. This does not mean that they invest only in 
general skills because this depends on the priorities defined by the state. Similar to CMEs, a 
larger proportion of young people attend initial VET if the state increases its political 
commitment to this type of training. Nevertheless, we argue that it is much more difficult to 
increase the number of young people attending firm-based training, because these countries 
lack the necessary institutions and coordination mechanisms. 
Strategies to increase firm-based training: the importance of coordination 
and institutions 
Considering the above-mentioned institutional legacies, we expected countries to address the 
need to increase firm-based training in different ways. It is easier for CMEs to increase firm-
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based training, because they already have the necessary institutions and coordination 
mechanisms. If countries strengthen institutional complementarities, this would potentially 
increase workplace training. But this has not happened in the past decades, as documented in 
the extensive literature (Glyn, 2006; Palier, 2010; Palier & Thelen, 2010; Streeck, 2009; 
Thelen, 2014; Thelen & Busemeyer, 2008). Some authors have argued that a liberalisation 
process is underway in CMEs, while others speak of a dualisation process. Despite 
differences, both arguments contend that the scope of CMEs has changed dramatically even 
though the existing coordination mechanisms have not been undermined. Changes have been 
felt in many areas: the generosity of the welfare state declined (including that of 
unemployment benefits); labour market regulation decreased (especially for workers outside 
the industrial core); and collective bargaining was decentralised and now covers a smaller 
proportion of the labour force. We could expect CMEs to maintain their strong commitment to 
their training regime – particularly at a time characterised by growing youth unemployment 
rates – but we do not expect reforms to be implemented to counter liberalisation and 
dualisation, because structural changes have been taking place in these political economies 
since the late 1980s.   
 It is difficult for LMEs to follow the same strategy as CMEs, i.e., to build the same 
institutional complementarities that support high investment in specific skills. On the one 
hand, they lack the necessary institutions and strategic coordination to do so, and on the other, 
this would jeopardise the institutional comparative advantages of these countries. According 
to the VoC literature, labour market flexibility and investment in general skills are crucial for 
competing in sectors where radical innovation prevails (Hall & Soskice, 2001). We argue, 
however, that an alternative strategy compatible with LMEs’ institutional legacy can be 
implemented. Historically, LMEs resolved the problem of the lack of investment in specific 
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skills by developing a voluntarist training regime (Busemeyer & Thelen, 2015; King, 1993, 
1997; Thelen, 2004). As explained by King and Wickham-Jones (1998, p. 442), ‘… 
voluntarism is defined by a framework in which firms and workers have been largely left 
alone by the State to formulate their own arrangements for training’. This model builds on the 
tradition of apprenticeships, in particular in the crafts sector, where in the Middle Ages a 
master craftsman was allowed to employ young people and instruct them in their craft 
(Hodgson, Spours, & Smith, 2017; Lodovici et al., 2013).  Although the system went through 1
several phases and the role of unions changed over time (losing importance after the 
neoliberal turn in the early 1980s), voluntarism has persisted (King, 1997). This means that 
some LME countries tackled firms’ reluctance to invest in specific skills by developing an 
apprenticeship system where firm-specific skills prevailed over school-based VET (unlike the 
German case where the two types of training are equally important).  Although 2
apprenticeships lost importance in the 1980s due to the neoliberal turn, they did not disappear 
altogether and some governments invested in this system in the 1990s (Busemeyer & Thelen, 
2015; Eichhorst et al., 2015; King, 1993; Lodovici et al., 2013; Thelen, 2014). It is therefore 
our hypothesis that to boost workplace-based training in LMEs, voluntarism has played a 
crucial role; firm-specific skills have prevailed and the state has actively supported the system 
by injecting public funds. In our perspective, voluntarism is compatible with the coordination 
mechanisms and institutions that prevail in LMEs. Furthermore, we hypothesise that trade 
unions have played a minor role in this process for two reasons: (i) they tried to guarantee 
 In addition to the UK, other LMEs have also invested in apprenticeships, namely the USA and Australia 1
(Eichhorst et al., 2015; Thelen, 2004, 2014). Notwithstanding, apprenticeships have less historical importance in 
the USA and Australia than in the UK.  
 Note that apprentices have access to both types of training, i.e., to firm-based training and to school-based 2
training (Eichhorst et al., 2015). The main difference with the German case is that workplace-based training is 
much more important and the type of skills taught at schools are firm-specific and not general.  
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high wages for skilled workers in LMEs by controlling the number of apprenticeships, which 
historically has led to great conflicts with employers (Thelen, 2004); and (ii) after the 
neoliberal turn in the early 1980s, they lost importance and strength.  
 It is more difficult for MMEs to increase firm-based training than it is for LMEs, due 
in part to the lack of both market and strategic coordination mechanisms and to their non-
complementary institutions. In light of the above discussion on CMEs and LMEs, two 
alternative strategies can be adopted: either a CME approach or an apprenticeship strategy. 
From our perspective, both strategies are difficult to implement in MMEs. In the case of the 
first strategy, these political economies have gone through a massive liberalisation process in 
the recent past; they were hit hard by the sovereign debt crisis and were forced by the EU to 
implement a set of structural reforms to further labour market flexibilisation and to reduce the 
weight of the public sector (Armingeon & Baccaro, 2012, 264; Hall, 2018; Pavolini, León, 
Guillén & Ascoli, 2015; Sacchi, 2015; Theodoropoulou, 2015). It is therefore very difficult to 
implement a system that requires cooperation between labour and capital, labour market 
regulation and generous unemployment benefits in a context characterised by the 
implementation of structural reforms. As for the apprenticeship approach, there are also some 
important caveats. Considering the key role played by the state in these political economies, it 
is much more difficult to safeguard firms’ autonomy with respect to the types of skills 
employees receive; trade unions are much more important (e.g. union density is higher and 
they mobilise the workforce more effectively) and are therefore able to block reforms that 
leave them out of the process (Marques & Salavisa, 2017); and, lastly, in a number of 
Mediterranean countries, a large proportion of young people attend state-run vocational 
courses that are often integrated in secondary schools that offer both general education and 
vocational courses but have few linkages with employers (Biavaschi et al., 2012; Eichhorst et 
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al., 2015; Homs, 2009; Icart & Rodríguez-Soler, 2017; Souto-Otero & Ure, 2012). Despite the 
difficulties of implementing each of the above-mentioned strategies, we believe measures 
were taken in MMEs to boost firm-based training, because youth unemployment has risen 
exponentially and these countries have received substantial funds from the EU to implement 
active labour market policies (ALMPs) (Tosun, 2017). Based on this discussion we 
formulated three main hypotheses.  
H1: Denmark made a commitment to increase workplace-based training to fight youth 
unemployment between 2008 and 2015. The growing liberalisation of the Danish political 
economy has weakened the key institutions of the Danish skill formation system and we 
therefore hypothesise that although the share of students in this type of training is high, it has 
not increased.  
H2: The UK increased investment in workplace-based training to fight youth unemployment 
between 2008 and 2015. It is our hypothesis that voluntarism was crucial to boosting this type 
of training: firm-specific skills prevailed, the state actively supported the system by injecting 
public funds, and trade unions were kept out of the process. The share of students enrolled in 
this type of training can be expected to have increased.  
H3: Facing a massive rise in youth unemployment, Spanish governments tried to increase the 
share of students enrolled in workplace-based training between 2008 and 2015. 
Notwithstanding, we hypothesise that the lack of CME- and LME-type institutional 
complementarities have made it difficult to implement a coherent strategy leading to this 
change. Consequently, the number of students attending this type of training is not likely to 
have increased over these years. 
Methods and data 
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In our analysis, three cases are compared: Denmark, the UK and Spain. We chose these 
countries, not only because they belong to different skill formation systems and different VoC, 
but also because they were all facing increasing levels of youth unemployment during the 
period under study (see the Appendix, Table A1). Accordingly, we applied a comparison of 
three typical cases as suggested by the typology of case studies by Gerring (2008), studying 
the UK as an LME, Denmark as a CME and Spain as an MME. Furthermore, by focusing on 
countries which were all facing increasing levels of youth unemployment during the analysed 
period, the most important context factor could be held constant. As argued by Gerring 
(2008), the comparison of typical cases is suitable for hypothesis testing and to that end fits 
our research design and research question. There is extensive literature on the UK and its 
liberal system (Busemeyer & Thelen, 2015; Finegold & Soskice, 1988; Hodgson et al., 2017; 
King, 1993, 1997; King & Wickham-Jones, 1998; Thelen, 2004) and on Denmark’s collective 
system (Busemeyer & Thelen, 2015; Thelen, 2014). Spain has been included in the group of 
MMEs by many authors (Hall, 2017; Hall & Soskice, 2001, 21; Molina & Rhodes, 2007) who 
have argued that its VET system is historically school-based rather than firm-based 
(Biavaschi et al., 2012; Eichhorst et al., 2015; Homs, 2009; Icart & Rodríguez-Soler, 2017; 
Souto-Otero & Ure, 2012). 
Turning to the empirical strategy, the outcome variable is the share of students 
attending workplace-based VET. Five dimensions were analysed: measures taken by 
governments to promote workplace-VET, coordination within the industrial relations system, 
employment protection legislation, generosity of unemployment benefits, and level of public 
investment in training. The first four dimensions were chosen because the literature review 
shows that they have been crucial for supporting high investment in workplace-based VET. 
The latter was included to account for the role of public authorities. The indicators and data 
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sources used are as follows:  
• Share of students attending workplace-based VET: This was measured as the share of 
students at the upper secondary level in ‘dual training’ schemes, i.e., vocational training 
schemes that combine school-based and workplace-based VET (Busemeyer & Iversen, 
2012, 217). We used the Education at a Glance Database (OECD, various years, indicator 
C1.4). Data for this indicator refer to the period between 2008 and 2015. 
• Measures taken by governments to promote workplace-based VET: This was measured by 
analysing the content of each reform focused on promoting workplace-based VET. We 
used data from the LABREF database (European Commission, 2018). All policy measures 
that focused on promoting workplace-based VET implemented between 2008 and 2015 
were analysed. For a complete description of all policy measures, see the online-only 
Appendix (Tables S1, S2 and S3).  
• Coordination in the industrial relations system: Two indicators were used − coordination 
of wage-setting and collective bargaining coverage. The first indicator was based on 
Kenworthy (2001) and ranged between 1 and 5. The higher the level of centralisation of 
wage-setting, the higher is the value for this indicator. The second indicator refers to the 
proportion of all wage earners covered by collective agreements. Both indicators were 
taken from the ICTWSS database (Visser, 2016) and data refer only to the period between 
2008 and 2014 because no data were available for 2015. 
• Strictness of employment protection – individual and collective dismissals (regular 
contracts): Employment protection was measured using the ‘employment protection 
index’, taken from the OECD indicators of Employment Protection (OECD, 2014). This 
indicator is the weighted sum of sub-indicators related to the regulations for individual 
dismissals (weight of 5/7) and additional provisions for collective dismissals (2/7). It 
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incorporates 13 detailed data items. This index ranges between 0 and 6. The higher the 
level of regulation, the higher is the value for this indicator. Data for this indicator refer 
only to the period between 2008 and 2014 because no data were available for 2015. 
• Generosity of unemployment benefits: We relied on the CWED dataset (CWED, 2017) for 
information on the overall generosity of unemployment benefits before the crisis (year 
2008). This index is based on the same indicators that Esping-Andersen (1990) used to 
develop his typology on welfare regimes, namely: replacement rate of unemployment 
benefits (single and family), qualification period to obtain access to unemployment 
benefits, duration of unemployment benefits, number of days waiting before receiving 
unemployment benefits, and share of the working population that is insured against the 
risk of unemployment. As the CWED does not provide data for the entire period, we 
complemented these data with qualitative information provided by the LABREF database 
(European Commission, 2018) for the period between 2008 and 2015. All reforms of 
unemployment benefits were analysed. To code data, we used four categories: reforms 
towards increasing generosity, reforms towards decreasing generosity, compulsory 
activation for benefit recipients, and other. See the online-only Appendix (Tables S4, S5 
and S6) for detailed information on the reforms made to unemployment benefits and how 
each policy was coded. 
• Public investment on vocational training: This measure was constructed by multiplying 
public spending on upper secondary education (as percentage of GDP) with the share of 
upper secondary students in vocational training, regardless of whether training was 
located in schools or in firms (Busemeyer & Iversen, 2012). We used the Education at a 
Glance Database (OECD, various years, indicators C1.4 and B2.2). Data refer to the 
period between 2008 and 2015.  
  16
Increasing workplace-based training to fight youth unemployment 
The main aim of this section is to assess how each country has addressed the need to increase 
workplace-based training and how this links with reforms in labour market policies 
(employment protection legislation and generosity of unemployment benefits), coordination 
in the industrial relations system, and the level of public investment in vocational training. 
Before turning to this analysis, we look briefly at the relative importance of these measures. 
 We draw on the work of Tosun et al. (2017) for this analysis. These authors developed 
a typology to study youth-oriented ALMPs and also used the LABREF database.  After 3
making some minor changes to this typology, we obtained the following categories: 
workplace-based training; labour market training; job search assistance and monitoring, wage 
subsidies, public sector employment programmes; promotion of self-employment and 
entrepreneurship; and other. To compare with their typology, we excluded the category 
‘packages’ because we counted each programme separately. We also changed the first 
category from ‘human capital investment’ to ‘workplace-based training’ as this was the main 
focus of our study. Lastly, we added a new category − promotion of self-employment and 
entrepreneurship’. Table 1 shows that all three countries implemented policies to boost 
workplace-based training.  It also provides information on other policies, and this has allowed 4
us to assess the relative importance of each policy-area. Findings indicate, firstly, that 
Denmark places a clear focus on the ‘workplace-based training’ and ‘labour market training’. 
Secondly, ‘wage subsidies’ is the most important policy-area in Spain. Lastly, investment in 
‘workplace-based training’ is relatively high in the UK, which is the most eclectic country 
because measures were implemented in all policy-areas (see the online-only Appendix, Tables 
 To develop their typology, Tosun et al. (2017) drew on Caliendo and Schmidl (2016) and on Bonoli (2010).  3
 Only ALMPs targeting young people were included for the purposes of our analysis. 4
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S1, S2 and S3, for detailed information on all the policies implemented and on how each 
policy was coded).  
Table 1 to feature here 
Denmark: improving the attractiveness of dual training in a context of liberalisation 
In Denmark, four initiatives were taken to increase the quality of vocational youth education.  5
First, as part of a package to address rising youth unemployment (worth €8.6 million), in 2011 
the national government set the goal of training more unemployed youths through the adult 
apprenticeship scheme. In the same year, it went further and invested €340 million to 
establish 10,400 extra apprenticeships in 2012. Moreover, it created 1,500 extra traineeships 
in vocational schools. In 2012, an additional measure was taken to increase vocational 
students’ access to traineeships. A series of new initiatives was implemented, including 
apprenticeship-centres at vocational schools. These three measures sought mainly to improve 
access to traineeships and apprenticeships. However, after a tripartite agreement was reached, 
a more important reform was implemented in 2014 with the following key measures: a 
simpler structure that reduced the number of introductory courses from 12 to 4, with 
specialised education starting after one year and continuing for the following two years and 
including apprenticeships of some form; stricter entry requirements; an increase in teaching 
time to a minimum of 25 hours per week; more opportunities to move from vocational youth 
education to higher education; and more practical training courses designed with the help of 
the social partners. The main objective of this reform was to increase the quality of vocational 
youth education and thereby to attract more young people to the system. In the scope of this 
reform, the state invested €400 million to improve the quality of vocational youth education.  
 Denmark is the only country in our sample that has not received funds from the EU to implement the Youth 5
Guarantee, because the level of youth unemployment there is lower than in other EU countries (Tosun, 2017). 
Nevertheless, this has not stopped the Danish government from implementing new policy measures in this area.
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It should be stressed that these reforms were made in the context of a decline in the 
share of students attending workplace-based VET; indeed, it was not only the rise of youth 
unemployment and the decline in the employment rate that concerned policy-makers (see the 
Appendix, Table A1). As can be seen in Table 2, the share of students fell from 47.5% in 2008 
to 42% in 2015 despite the fact that public authorities were more committed to improving the 
system at the time. By increasing the number of apprenticeships and traineeships, raising the 
quality of vocational education and facilitating the transition to higher education, the 
government tried to tackle the drop in student numbers. As for the other dimensions, the 
institutions found to support dual training systems in the above literature review were clearly 
weaker. First and foremost, the generosity of unemployment benefits dropped substantially in 
the previous decade. While this trend was already visible before the economic crisis (Figure 
2), the number of reforms reducing unemployment benefits (or implementing compulsory 
activation for benefit recipients) was high in Denmark (Table 3). There was more 
liberalisation in the Danish political economy, especially in the field of labour market policy 
(Thelen, 2014). Despite some reforms in the field of industrial relations the situation did not 
change dramatically: coordination of wage setting and collective bargaining coverage 
remained high (Table 4). Interestingly, the most substantial reform to the VET system was 
negotiated with social partners, thus confirming the importance of coordination in the 
industrial relations system. On the other hand, public investment in VET decreased between 
2010 and 2013 before increasing again in 2014 due to the above-mentioned reform (Figure 3). 
Taken as a whole, the dual training system is still in place in Denmark and there was an 
attempt to strengthen it during the crisis by improving its quality. Nevertheless, the weakening 
of crucial institutions due to liberalisation is transforming the Danish political economy and 
this makes it difficult to revert the current downward trend in the number of students 
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attending workplace-based training. In our view, the stronger relationship between the VET 
system and higher education (mentioned above) is also a sign of this transformation.  
Tables 2 and  3, Figures 2 and 3 to feature here 
The United Kingdom: strengthening the voluntarist training regime 
To address the rise in youth unemployment, which was greater than in overall unemployment 
(see the Appendix, Table A1), nine policies were implemented in the UK to boost work-based 
training, all of which focused on strengthening the apprenticeship system. In 2008, ‘The 
National Apprenticeship Service’ was established as the single body responsible for the 
delivery of Apprenticeships across England.  This consisted of an organisational reform that 6
aimed to create better conditions to expand the apprenticeship system by creating a web-based 
vacancy matching system and a system to coordinate funding. In 2009, the Labour 
Government implemented a policy called the ‘Apprenticeship Grant for Employers’ to foster 
new Apprenticeships for young unemployed people aged 16 or 17. In the scope of this 
programme, employers were offered a grant of £2,500 for each person trained. The target was 
to create 5,000 apprenticeship places. In the same year, the government published the ‘White 
Paper on Skills for Growth: The national skills strategy’ (BIS, 2009), in which they set the 
objective of doubling the number of advanced apprenticeships to 35,000 over the following 
two years and announced a total investment of €148 million to achieve this goal. Furthermore, 
a new Apprenticeship Scholarship Fund was created (offering bursaries up to €1,123) to 
support apprentices who wanted to go on to higher education. Thus, besides expanding the 
system, this strategy established a better link between the apprenticeship system and higher 
education. It is well-known that investing heavily in higher education is a key characteristic of 
 Note that the majority of these reforms targeted England and not Wales, Scotland or Northern Ireland. This is 6
important because, as shown in Table 3, the number of apprenticeships increased mainly in England. 
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LMEs, and it is therefore logical to expand the apprenticeship system at the same time as 
investing heavily in higher education.  
Later, in 2011, the Conservative-Lib Dem Coalition furthered these policies and 
increased the scope of the ‘Apprenticeship Grant for Employers’ as part of the ‘Youth 
Contract’. The target increased to 20,000 apprenticeship places (in 2012 this measure was 
extended to December 2014). Also in 2011, two additional measures were announced: the 
creation of an additional 75,000 adult apprenticeship places (an investment of €296 million); 
and the government’s use of the ‘Education Act’ to reaffirm its commitment to increase the 
number of apprenticeships. In 2013, an important reform was implemented that strengthened 
the voluntarist character of the British training regime. Following the Richard Review of 
Apprenticeships in 2012 (Richard, 2012), the Coalition government allowed employers to 
design their own apprenticeships. Under this reform (BIS, 2013, p. 11):  
… it is the responsibility of employers, working with professional bodies and others, 
to design the new Apprenticeship standards. The government cannot determine the 
skills needed for all occupations, and will not try to do so’.  
As explained by Hodgson et al. (2017, p. 656), through this reform,  
… employers have been put in the ‘driving seat’ of creating new standards of 
competence and apprentices will be required to demonstrate these through a rigorous 
graded assessment (…) at the end of their apprenticeship; together with appropriate 
skills in English and Mathematics.  
Lastly, in 2015, the government announced that the Apprenticeship Grant for 
Employers would be extended until the end of the 2016−2017 academic year. In sum, both 
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governments invested substantially in the apprenticeship system. While the Labour 
Government did so by incentivising a better relationship between the apprenticeship system 
and higher education, the Coalition Government gave employers more autonomy to design 
their own apprenticeships.   
As hypothesised above, the UK’s strategy to increase firm-based training was focused 
on strengthening the apprenticeship system. Besides directly financing the system, the 
Coalition government gave more autonomy to employers. This is in line with the earlier 
discussion about the voluntarist tradition in LMEs. Also as hypothesised, trade unions did not 
play an important role. Interestingly, this happened with both the Labour and the 
Conservative-Lib Dem Coalition governments, and thus confirms the neoliberal character of 
the British political economy. As for the results, data presented in Table 2 show that the 
number of people attending workplace-based training increased over these years. Due to the 
missing OECD data for the period between 2008 and 2011, we provide additional data in 
Table 5 which shows that after several measures were implemented in 2009, the number of 
apprentices rose substantially. Lastly, no substantial reforms were implemented during this 
period for the other dimensions; employment protection, coordination of wage setting, 
collective bargaining coverage and generosity of unemployment benefits all remained low 
(Figures 2 and 4; Tables 3 and 4). However, it is interesting to note the marked increase in 
public investment in VET in the UK over this period, which demonstrates the state’s 
commitment to boosting this type of training (Figure 3).  
Tables 4 and 5 and Figure 4 to feature here 
Spain: the training and apprenticeship contract as a social policy instrument 
The Spanish labour market was hard hit by the economic crisis; youth and overall 
unemployment rose exponentially and employment rates declined. The situation in Spain was 
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worse than in Denmark and the UK, (see the Appendix, Table A1). Three reforms were 
implemented in Spain to increase the share of young people attending workplace-based 
training. In 2011, in the scope of a package of measures to address youth unemployment, the 
training and apprenticeship contract, was reformed to combine vocational training with paid 
employment (Spanish Royal Decree 10/2011). In contrast to the earlier Spanish Royal Decree 
1/1995, the new contract focused on workers aged between 16 and 25 years, the maximum 
length was extended to two years and working hours could not exceed 75% of the total 
contract time. Furthermore, some fiscal benefits were introduced for firms that hire workers 
over the age of 20 who are registered with Public Employment Services (i.e., registered as 
unemployed), namely, 100% reduction in social contributions for firms with under 250 
employees and 75% reduction for firms above this threshold. Firms that converted the 
training and apprenticeship contract into a permanent contract would receive an additional 
€1000 benefit. A new reform was introduced in 2012 (Spanish Royal Decree 3/2012) to 
extend the scope of this contract. The following revisions were implemented: the age limit 
was raised to 30 years; the maximum duration was raised from two to three years; the 
effective working hours for those hired with this contract increased (training activities should 
represent at least 25% first year and 15% subsequent years); in addition to the fiscal benefits 
introduced in 2011, workers’ contributions to social security were cut by 100%; the benefit for 
firms converting the training and apprenticeship contract into a permanent contract increased 
to €1500 (€1800 in the case of women) and was extended to three years (instead of one year); 
and, lastly, under the 2012 reform, after the contract expired, a worker could be hired by the 
same firm with another training contract if the contract was for a different professional 
qualification. In addition to these two reforms, a new law was approved in 2012 (Spanish 
Royal Decree 1529/2012), aimed primarily at implementing a dual vocational training system 
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in Spain. Although this broad objective is referred to in the legislation, the implementation of 
the training and apprenticeship contract (which had already been in place since 2011) is the 
main initiative mentioned. According to this law, such contracts represent a contractual 
channel for the dual training system and are therefore seen as the cornerstone of this reform. 
In sum, in 2011 and 2012, the training and apprenticeship contract was revised, and a new law 
was implemented in 2012 to create a dual training system.  
Although the dual system was a stated aim of the legislation, in fact the existing 
legislation in Spain was mainly adapted to fight youth unemployment and the training 
contract was used as a social policy rather than a skill formation instrument. Indeed, the 
reform of the training and apprenticeship contract sought to give young unemployed people 
an opportunity, as only registered unemployed people were entitled to state aid. As explained 
above, the actual working hours of those hired on this contract were very long, so there was 
little time left for training. The legislation did not aim to make deep-seated reforms to the 
VET system in Spain, which is historically managed by the state and takes place in public 
schools rather than at the workplace (Biavaschi et al., 2012; Homs, 2009; Icart & Rodríguez-
Soler, 2017; Souto-Otero & Ure, 2012).  The focus was on combatting youth unemployment 7
by keeping young people in the labour market. This is illustrated by the fact that after a 
contract expires, the worker can be hired by the same firm on another training contract, as 
long as it is for a different professional qualification. This was made possible because the 
Spanish VET system is divided into three subsystems: formal VET, managed by the education 
ministry; continuous VET, managed by the social partners; and VET for unemployed, 
managed by the ministry of employment (Souto-Otero & Ure, 2012). In the context of the 
economic crisis and rising youth unemployment, the latter subsystem gained importance 
 According to Icart and Rodríguez-Soler (2017), in 2012−2013, 76.6% of VET students were attending public 7
schools.  
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because its main goal was indeed to fight unemployment. This subsystem had used training 
contracts widely in the past, so it was not surprising that this policy was important after the 
economic crisis (Biavaschi et al., 2012; Eichhorst et al., 2015). Table 1 also shows that 
policies promoting training contracts were complemented with measures fostering wage 
subsidies, i.e., initiatives that include incentives for firms that hire young unemployed people. 
Overall, no substantial reforms were made to the formal and continuous VET system in Spain; 
policies to promote workplace-based training targeted unemployed people and incentives to 
hire young people were considered the best strategy to fight unemployment whilst boosting 
workplace-based training.   8
 Some striking changes have taken place in the other dimensions in the years under 
study. In the literature review, we discussed the liberal reforms implemented in MMEs during 
the sovereign debt crisis, and indeed, Spain introduced several such reforms. Employment 
protection was weakened (Figure 4), coordination of wage setting was reduced and the 
coverage of collective bargaining decreased slightly (Table 4). The changes in unemployment 
benefits were not as large, but several measures were implemented to increase compulsory 
activation for benefit recipients (Table 3). Moreover, the level of public investment in 
vocational training did not increase over these years (Figure 3). Consequently, and in light of 
the strategy followed to boost firm-based training (focused mainly on the VET for 
unemployed), it is not surprising that the share of students attending workplace-based VET 
did not increase between 2008 and 2015 (Table 2). 
Comparison of the three cases 
 Interestingly, in the scope of the Spanish National Youth Guarantee Implementation Plan, two separate actions 8
are mentioned: (i) promotion of dual vocational training through contracts for training and apprenticeships; and 
(ii) promotion of vocational training through schools (Piqué, Veà & Strecker 2015). 
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In this section, we make a comparative analysis of the findings of the three case studies. 
As hypothesised above, the UK implemented measures to increase firm-based training, but it 
did so without undermining its institutions or coordination mechanisms, i.e., these measures 
did not build institutional complementarities as in CMEs. The UK boosted workplace-based 
training by strengthening the voluntarist character of its training regime and promoting 
apprenticeships that are increasingly managed by employers. As explained above, employers 
have been responsible for designing the new apprenticeship standards since 2013. 
Furthermore, trade unions have been kept out of the process and the state’s role in the type of 
training apprentices receive is minimal even though it finances the system. Denmark already 
had this dual training system in place, but implemented reforms to improve its quality. The 
Danish case is an interesting example: As youth unemployment rose after 2008 and the 
number of students attending firm-based training was decreasing, the national government 
introduced reforms to raise the quality of vocational education and thus make it more 
attractive. The recent liberalisation of labour market policies in Denmark has weakened 
institutional complementarities and this may pose challenges to the dual training system in the 
future. Nevertheless, coordination has been maintained in the industrial relations system and 
collective bargaining coverage is still very high. Lastly, also as hypothesised, Spain has 
experienced many difficulties in boosting workplace-based training. Unlike the UK where it 
increased, and Denmark where it was already very high, the number of students attending 
firm-based training did not rise in Spain. Policies to promote firm-based training, such as the 
reform of the training and apprenticeship contract, were used mainly as a social policy 
instrument, i.e., to bring young unemployed people into the labour market. Despite the 
Spanish government’s stated intention to create a dual training system, there were no deep-
seated reforms to the formal VET, which continues to take place in schools rather than the 
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workplace, and the state coordinates the system without much employer involvement. 
Furthermore, the implementation of structural reforms meant that employment protection 
legislation was liberalised and the coordination of the industrial relations system decreased. 
The main innovation has been the reform of the training and apprenticeship contract, but this 
has not led to reforms in other spheres of the Spanish political economy that might have 
created better conditions for a dual training system. The state has continued to play a leading 
role despite the context of growing liberalisation. Taken as a whole, the three countries have 
followed different strategies to increase workplace-based training. This was because the 
different institutional legacies in the three countries influenced how they addressed the need 
to boost this kind of training. From our perspective, this was the cause of the differing results, 
notably when comparing Spain and the UK.  
Conclusions 
Three main conclusions can be drawn from the comparative analysis conducted in this article. 
First, CMEs and LMEs can promote workplace-based training more easily than MMEs. 
Second, CMEs and LMEs use distinct methods to boost this type of training; whereas CMEs 
rely on reinforcing the dual training system, LMEs promote voluntarism. Third, policy 
makers must take these two conclusions into account when designing public policies. In 
MMEs, workplace-based training can only be promoted after implementing more radical 
reforms in other areas. As the Spanish case illustrates, it does not make sense to propose to 
create a dual training system and simultaneously deregulate labour legislation or reduce the 
coordination of the industrial relations system. As for CMEs, liberalisation must be offset if 
governments wish to increase the share of students attending this type of training. The Danish 
case shows that labour market deregulation and a reduction in the generosity of the welfare 
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state make it difficult to strengthen the dual-training system. If institutional complementarities 
are weakened, the skill formation system will also face problems. As for LMEs, the 
promotion of this type of training entails maintaining high public investment and the 
prevalence of firm specific skills over school-based VET. The British case is an excellent 
example of this process because it illustrates how to boost this kind of training in an LME.     
The main goal of this article is to provide a more in-depth understanding of the 
functioning, effectiveness and forms of workplace-based training measures to fight youth 
unemployment in the three countries under study. Future research could also include 
quantitative analyses of more country cases over longer periods of time in varying economic 
contexts to see how far the insights gleaned herein are applicable to a larger set of cases and 
in other economic circumstances. 
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Table 1. Youth-oriented Active Labour Market Policies (2008−2015), by type.  
Source: Own elaboration based on the LABREF database (European Commission, 2018). 
Table 2. Share of students attending workplace-based VET. 
Source: Education at a Glance Database (OECD, various years). 
Table 3. Unemployment benefits reforms (2008‒2015), by type.  
Source: Own elaboration based on the LABREF database (European Commission, 2018).  
Denmark Spain United Kingdom
Workplace-based training 4   3   9
Labour market training 4   3   3
Job search assistance and monitoring 1   1   3
Wage subsidies 0   7   3
Public sector employment programmes 0   0   1
Promotion of self-employment and 
entrepreneurship
0   0   1
Other 0   3   3
Total 9 17 23
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Spain 1.8 1.7 2.2   2   1 :   0   0
Denmark 47.5 46.5 45.3 45 44 43 42 42
United Kingdom : : : : 17 25 24 22
Denmark Spain United Kingdom
Reforms towards increasing generosity   3 11 0
Reforms towards decreasing generosity   4   3 1
Compulsory activation for benefit recipients   3   6 4
Other   0   0 1
Total 10 20 6
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Table 4. Coordination of Wage Setting (CWS) and Collective Bargaining Coverage (CBC).  
Source: ICTWSS Database (Visser, 2016). 
Table 5. New apprenticeships in the UK. 
Source: Lodovici et al. (2013, p. 60) 




























K 4 : 4 82.0 4 83.0 4 : 4 : 4 84.0 4 :
SP 4 79.3 2 81.4 3 77.4 3 77.5 3 77.5 3 77.6 3 :
U
K 1 33.6 1 32.7 1 30.9 1 31.2 1 29.3 1 29.5 1 :
Academic year England Wales Scotland Northern Ireland
2005/06 175,000 27,990 20,196 :
2006/07 184,400 19,590 16,913 :
2007/08 224,800 21,530 15,803 5,587
2008/09 239,900 18,100 10,579 7,372
2009/10 279,700 16,355 16,655 6,973
2010/11 457,200 18,580 21,561 9,364
2011/12 520,600 : 26,427 8,395
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Table A1. Employment statistics – Denmark, United Kingdom and Spain (2008–2015). 







Denmark 2008 77.9 % 3.5 % 8.0 %
2009 75.3 % 6.1 % 11.8 %
2010 73.3 % 7.6 % 14.0 %
2011 73.1 % 7.7 % 14.2 %
2012 72.6 % 7.7 % 14.1 %
2013 72.5 % 7.2 % 13.1 %
2014 72.8 % 6.8 % 12.6 %
2015 73.5 % 6.3 % 10.8 %
United 
Kingdom
2008 71.5 % 5.7 % 15.0 %
2009 69.9 % 7.7 % 19.1 %
2010 69.4 % 7.9 % 19.9 %
2011 69.3 % 8.2 % 21.3 %
2012 69.9 % 8.1 % 21.2 %
2013 70.5 % 7.7 % 20.7 %
2014 71.9 % 6.3 % 17.0 %
2015 72.7 % 5.4 % 14.6 %
Spain 2008 64.5 % 11.3 % 24.5 %
2009 60.0 % 18.0 % 37.7 %
2010 58.8 % 20.0 % 41.5 %
2011 58.0 % 21.5 % 46.2 %
2012 55.8 % 24.9 % 52.9 %
2013 54.8 % 26.2 % 55.5 %
2014 56.0 % 24.6 % 53.2 %
2015 57.8 % 22.2 % 48.3 %
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Figure 1. Development of youth unemployment in seven European countries. 
$  
Source: Labour Force Survey (Eurostat, 2018). 
Figure 2. Generosity of unemployment benefits.  
$  
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Figure 3. Public investment in vocational training. 
   
Source: Education at a Glance Database (OECD, various years). 
Note: Data is not available for Denmark in 2015. 
Figure 4. Strictness of employment protection – individual and collective dismissals (regular 
contracts). 
$  
Source: OECD Indicators of Employment Protection (OECD, 2014). 
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Appendix online only Tables S1, S2, S3, S4, S5, S6 
Supporting Information 
This document details the statements extracted from the LABREF database for the coding of youth-
oriented active labour market policies and reforms to unemployment benefits. The text given in the 
description column is directly quoted from the sources indicated. The countries are presented in 
alphabetical order.  
Table S1 - Youth oriented active labour market policies in Denmark (2008−2015). 
Policy measures Description
2008 
Active labour market policies 
Public Employment Services (job 
assistance, job-counselling etc.) 
Guidance to youth aged under 25 
Source: LABREF 
Coding: 3 
Young people aged under 25 who have not completed 
an upper secondary education programme and who are 
not currently enrolled in such a programme will be 
offered guidance by municipalities.
2008 
Active labour market policies 
Special schemes for youth 




In the 10th grade, students have to choose at least two 
different education programmes, one of which must be 
either a vocational education and training programme 
or a vocationally oriented upper secondary education 
programme. Students can also spend up to 4 weeks in 
voluntary bridge-building programmes to a 
vocationally oriented upper secondary education 
programme or combinations of bridge building to a 
vocationally oriented upper secondary education 
programme and a non-paid practical training 
placement with an educational perspective. The 
academic year is planned in such a way as to ensure 
that young people who drop out of an upper secondary 
education programme stay within the field of 
education. Exams can be taken in the winter semester, 
allowing the pupils concerned to begin a vocational 
education or training programme in January if ready to 
do so. 
2011 
Active labour market policies 
Special schemes for youth 
Four initiatives to help young 
unemployed – budget bill 
Source: LABREF 
Coding: 2 + 1  
Four initiatives worth DKK 60 million for 2012 and 
2013: (1) Training more unemployed young through 
the adult apprenticeship scheme; (2) Job rotation to 
help more unemployed young people enter the labour 
market; (3) A job and skill development package for 
academically weak young people; (4) Trainee 




Active labour market policies 
Special schemes for youth 




Initiatives were adopted to help young into education 
or jobs, worth a total of DKK 100 million: (1) 
Possibility to enter an ‘upgrading of skills job’ for all 
young people, regardless of education; (2) Targeted 
training for young unemployed, including separate 
active measures towards young unemployed within the 
construction sector; (3) Strengthened effort towards 
unemployed academics; (4) Job rotation scheme/
arrangement for unemployed with a higher education; 
(5) Courses in reading, writing and mathematics for an 
increased number of young people; (6) Campaigning 
for an increased number of work-experience 
placements and traineeships. 
2011 
Active labour market policies 
Training 
More funding for apprenticeships, 
vocational education and training  
Source: LABREF 
Coding: 1 
Broad political agreement to allocate 2.6 billion DKK 
(€0.34 billion) to establish 10,400 extra 
apprenticeships in 2012. On top of that will be created 
1,500 extra traineeships on vocational schools. 
Increased resources are also allocated to support the 
increased activities elsewhere in the educational 
system. 70 million DKK (€10 million) are set aside to 
improve the quality of vocational education.
2012 
Active labour market policies 




Bridging programmes, job rotation schemes, 
vocational schemes, special training consultants at 
vocational schools and strengthening of ‘knowledge 
pilot schemes’: Temporary measure.
2012 
Active labour market policies 
Special schemes for youth 




Measure to increase the access of vocational students 
to traineeships. A range of new initiatives including 
apprenticeship-centres at the vocational schools.
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2013 
Active labour market policies 
Special schemes for youth 
More involvement of social partners in 
VET 
Source: LABREF 
Coding: NOT CODED (this is not a 
policy, but a tripartite agreement)
The government has been looking at reforming the 
system for some time, and has held tripartite talks with 
the social partners. In a second round of talks, on 2 
October 2013, the government announced a tripartite 
agreement on a common declaration of intent. 
Crucially, the government had revised its position and 
accepted a number of proposals previously rejected. 
The declaration includes a number of measures on 
social partner involvement. It says social partners will 
take an active role in addressing the challenge to 
establish a sufficient number of practical training 
courses. It was also agreed that the Employer’s 
Contribution to Education (AUB) would increase. The 
government plans to spend DKK 3 billion (€0.4 billion 
as at 19 February 2014) on implementing the reform. 
The main aims are to increase the quality of vocational 
youth education and make sure that the proportion of 
the youth cohort at these schools will increase from 
18% to 25%. The key measures of the proposal are: 
simpler structure, stronger entry requirements, increase 
teaching time, possibility to move to higher education, 
better matching, ‘flex-education’, vocational education 
courses for adults, targeted education for people aged 
over 25, more practical training courses. 
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2014 
Active labour market policies 
Training 




The government plans to spend DKK 3 billion (€0.4 
billion as at 19 February 2014) on implementing the 
reform aimed at increasing the quality of vocational 
youth education and making sure that the proportion of 
the youth cohort at these schools will increase from 
18% to 25%. The key measures of the proposal are: a 
simpler structure – reducing the number of 
introductory courses from 12 to 4, with specialized 
education starting after 1 year and continuing for the 
following 2 years, and including apprenticeships of 
some form; stronger entry requirements, with a 
minimum ‘02’ grade in Danish and mathematics 
needed during the final exam in secondary school, 
though an agreement on a practical training place or 
passing of exams arranged at the vocational youth 
schools themselves will also give access; an increase 
in teaching time to a minimum of 25 hours per week; 
improved opportunities to move from vocational youth 
education to higher education; an extra year in 
secondary school, for those who need it, which will 
specialize in preparing students for vocational youth 
education; matching access to some popular courses 
with labour market prospects for the skills taught; 
limited access to the most popular courses if labour 
market prospects are not considered good enough; a 
new ‘flex-education’ (maximum 2 years) for young 
people aged under 25 who are not qualified for a 
standard vocational youth education; new vocational 
education courses for adults, which should ensure 
vocational youth education is aimed at young people; 
targeted courses for the people aged over 25 who are 
unskilled and want to acquire skills; more practical 
training courses designed with the help of the social 
partners. 
  42
Table S2 - Youth oriented active labour market policies in Spain (2008-2015) 
Policy measures Description
2008 
Active labour market policies  
Training 
Reform of vocational training system 
Source: LABREF 
Coding: 2
I) Extending the network of Integrated Vocational 
Training Centres; II) Creation of a network of 25 
National Vocational Training Reference Centres, to be 
regulated by Law 229/2008 of 15 February 2008. 
These centres will be opened in all autonomous 
communities and will be responsible for programming 
and implementation of innovative and experimental 
training activities in the framework of the National 
List of Professional Qualifications. This network will 
be coordinated by the general state administration, 
with the collaboration of autonomous communities 
and most representative trade unions and employer 
organisations, through the General Vocational Training 
Council, a tripartite governmental advisory body; III) 
Establishment of a system to assess and accredit the 
professional skills acquired through work experience 
or informal training. Candidates who have their skills 
accredited will be given individual advice on the 
stages that they need to undergo in order to complete 
their training itinerary and obtain a qualification. If 
they fail to accredit their experience, they will be 
advised on the training possibilities for future rounds; 
IV) Setting an On-Line Platform for training modules 
at distance (35 training modules will be available in 
the school year 2009–2010); V) Simplifying the ways 
of access and promotion between initial qualification 
programmes and the vocational training of secondary 
degree, thus easing life-long learning; VI) making 
more flexible the access to middle-level training 
courses by accrediting work experience in 
combination with training. A system of public grants 
will be provided to enable 18–24 year old workers to 
obtain qualifications while working. Also plans to 
promote training contracts targeting young people who 
have dropped out of the education system in particular, 
in order to allow them to complete their education. 
2010 
Active labour market policies  
Employment subsidies 
Reallocation of tax benefits to support the 




Reallocation of tax benefits for the recruitment of 
individuals at high risk of unemployment. The groups 
defined following the reform are: 1) unemployed 
workers between 16 and 31 years of age: tax benefit of 
€800; 2) unemployed workers over 45 years of age: 
tax benefit of €1,200; 3) workers subject to training, 
handover and replacement contracts due to early 
retirement age: a tax benefit of €500 (€700 for 
women). These tax benefits will be complemented by 
other tax benefits aimed at encouraging the use of 




Active labour market policies  
Training 




Full subsidy for social security contributions in case of 
training contracts, while also improving the wages and 
the unemployment benefits upon termination. The 
requirements that a young worker must comply so as 
to qualify for an internship contract have been changed 
to include professional certificates, and the qualifying 
period has been extended to 5 years following 
graduation. Age limit for training contracts (contrato 
para la formacion) is extended to 24 years. A subsidy 
is provided for converting these contracts into the PEP 
contract (contract to promote permanent hiring with 
reduced severance payment). 
2011 
Active labour market policies  
Training 
Public Employment Services (job 
assistance, job-counselling etc.) 
Actions to improve the employability of 
young and low-skilled  
Source: LABREF 
Coding: 4 + 3 + 2
On the one hand, firms are granted fiscal benefits 
(100% reduction in social contributions for firms 
under 250 employees and 75% reduction for those 
firms above the threshold) if they sign part-time 
contracts with workers under 30 years of age who, in 
turn, must have been registered in a PES for at least 12 
out of the last 18 months. Contracts must last at least 6 
months, firms must register a net hiring and can be 
granted additional benefits should they hire 
handicapped workers or transform a temporary 
contract into a permanent one. These incentives are 
limited to contracts signed in the year after the Royal 
Decree Law is enacted. 
Various actions to improve the employability of 
targeted groups of long-term unemployed: young, 
older than 45 years of age, workers previously 
employed in construction and low-skilled workers. 
Actions combine tailored job action plans with training 
measures. ALMP actions (especially training 
programmes) will prioritize these groups. Last, the 
unemployed should represent between 20% and 40% 
of total people involved in training measures 
coordinated by the PES. 
2011 
Active labour market policies  
Special schemes for youth 




RD regulates the “business practices” or placements of 
young people (aged between 18- and 25) with 
professional qualification but without work experience 
and who are experiencing job placement difficulties. 
Companies will have to sign an agreement with the 
Public Employment Services for the development of 
the labour practices within the firm; the PES will make 
a short-list of candidates.
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2011 
Active labour market policies  
Training 
Training and apprenticeship contract 
Source: LABREF 
Coding: 1
The training and apprenticeship contract is revamped 
to combine vocational training or education with a 
paid employment for young low-skilled workers. It is 
now targeted to workers between 16 and 25 years of 
age without any professional qualification. 
Nevertheless, workers aged 25−30 may be hired via 
this contract until end-2013.The contract’s length must 
be set between 1 and 2 years with an option for a third 
year under certain circumstances. The training and 
education programmes must be organized through the 
national network of training and education centres and 
must lead to some kind of educative or professional 
qualification officially recognized. The job position 
must be linked to the training and working hours must 
be less than 75% of the total contract time. 
Some fiscal benefits (100% reduction in social 
contributions for firms under 250 employees and 75% 
reduction for those firms above the threshold) are 
granted to firms that hire workers aged 20 or more 
who are registered in a PSE. Firms need to prove a net 
increase in hiring and can be granted an additional 
1,000 EUR benefit should they transform the training 
and apprenticeship contract into a permanent contract. 
2011 
Active labour market policies  
Training 
Training on the job   
Source: LABREF 
Coding: 2
The goal is to provide young unemployed (18−25 
years of age) with little or no working experience with 
a first internship in a firm, getting involved in on-the-
job training actions and improving their profile and 
employability. The unemployed must accredit some 
education qualification (at least second-level 
secondary education) and will receive a remuneration 
amounting to at least 80% of IPREM. Firms must sign 
a collaboration agreement with a Public Employment 
Service (PES). Not labour contract, but a collaboration 
agreement, is signed between the firm and the worker. 
The internship length cannot exceed 9 months. 
2011 
Active labour market policies  
Training 
Extention of social security coverage to 
participants in training 
Source: LABREF 
Coding: 7 
Extension of social security coverage (except for 
unemployment benefits) to participants in training 
programs receiving any kind of monetary 
compensation and funded by public agencies or private 
bodies, when no legal employment relationship binds 
the participant with the training provider.
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2012 
Active labour market policies  
Special schemes for youth 
Reform of the apprenticeship and training 
contract 
Source: LABREF 
Coding: 1 + 4 
The reform extends the scope of this contract. The age 
limit for its use is increased to 30 years as long as 
unemployment rate remains at 15% or higher. The 
maximum duration has been raised from 2 to 3 years. 
The effective working hours for those hired with an 
apprenticeship and contract is also increased. With the 
new legislation, after the expiration of the contract, the 
worker can be hired with another training contract, 
also with the same firm, only if the contract is for a 
different professional qualification. In addition, firms 
recruiting workers unemployed as of 1.1.2012 will be 
entitled to reductions in social security contributions: 
100% reduction for firms with less than 250 workers 
and 75% reduction for the rest of firms, while workers 
contributions will be reduced 100%. Firms 
transforming apprenticeship and training contracts into 
permanent contracts will be entitled to a rebate €1500 
in social contributions per year over 3 years (€1800 in 
case of women). 
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2012 
Active labour market policies  
Training 
Measure to promote vocational training 
provided by both the education system 
and the public employment services 
Source: LABREF 
Coding: 1
The Decree develops certain aspects of the labour 
reform. The Decree consists of two sections. Section I 
provides the foundation for implementing dual 
vocational training. The Decree comprises six 
objectives: increasing the number of people who can 
get a degree of post-compulsory secondary education 
through the teaching of vocational training; reducing 
early school leaving; easing access to the labour 
market thanks to a reinforced contact with firms; 
increasing the link of business with vocational 
training, reinforcing the link between firms and 
vocational training teachers; improving data collection 
regarding vocational training. The theoretical training 
must be supervised by the educational authorities, and 
the objective should be obtaining professional 
qualifications. Educational institutions interested in 
participating in this training scheme should develop a 
training project that builds on collaboration with 
businesses. The relationship between schools and 
businesses must be formalised in a cooperation 
agreement, which must include a training programme 
covering the most important rules for the development 
of training activities (location, content, duration, 
timing, schedule, etc.). Students may earn a grant by 
the company or another institution. Second II 
elaborates the regulation of contracts for training and 
learning under the Statute of Workers. Such contracts 
represent a contractual channel for the dual training 
system, and also feature a combination of work and 
theoretical training. Unlike other dual forms of 
training, the participants are considered employees and 
are governed by labour law. The maximum duration of 
these contracts is three years; the employee is at least 
entitled to minimum wage for the given working time 
(theoretical training is not paid). Training activities 
should represent at least 25% (first year) or 15% 
(subsequent years) of working time specified in the 
contract, and can be offered by a specialised centre or 
in the company.  These contracts coexist with training 
contracts that can be signed with individuals who have 
a degree and seek to implement their knowledge in 
practice.   
2013 
Active labour market policies  
Employment subsidies 
Hiring incentives for hiring through TWA 
Source: LABREF 
Coding: 4 




Active labour market policies  
Special schemes for the disabled 
Hiring incentives for disabled 
Source: LABREF 
Coding: 4 
Incentives for hiring disabled people under the age of 
35.
2014 
Active labour market policies  
Special schemes for youth 
Reductions in employer social security 
contributions for hiring young enrolled in 




The beneficiaries of the National System of Youth 
Guarantee are youths under the age of 25 (or 30 if 
disabled) who do not have a job and are not integrated 
into systems of education or training, regardless of 
being registered as job seekers. Potential beneficiaries 
must enrol in an electronic media file that functions as 
a single list of demand. To register in this list, the 
applicant — in addition to the basic requirement of age 
and other nationality requirements and the registration 
of residency in a town — must meet the requirement 
of not having worked for the last 30 days or 
participated in training programmes over four hours 
per month for a period between 30 to 90 days, 
depending on the type of training.  Measures include a 
programme for the recruitment of young people 
enrolled in the system through reductions in employer 
social security contributions. The bonus amounts to 
EUR 300 a month when the contract is concluded for a 
full-time post, and between EUR 150 or 220 per 
month for part-time employment contracts (depending 
on the working day which should be at least equivalent 
to 50% of a full-time contract). The contract must be 
signed for an indefinite duration, and the bonus is 
applied in the first six months of its term. The bonus is 
only obtained when hiring increases the employment 
daily average of the last 30 days, and that employment 
is maintained during the bonus time. For these 
purposes, dismissals not declared unfair do not count. 
The type of training or educational activities provided 
to youth benefiting from this programme and the 
circumstances that allow companies to obtain benefits 
from the expected economic incentives for the 
recruitment of these young people were further 
clarified by Act 18/2014. 
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2015 
Active labour market policies 
Special schemes for youth 
Extension of the Youth Guarantee for 
workers between 25 and 30 
Source: LABREF 
Coding: 7
This Act ensures the Youth Guarantee for workers over 
25 and under 30 (until the youth unemployment rate is 
below 20%). 
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Table S3 - Youth oriented active labour market policies in the United Kingdom (2008−2015). 
Policy measures Description
2008 
Active labour market policies  
Special schemes for youth 




Introducing the requirement for, by 2013, all 17-year-
olds, and, by 2015, all 18-year-olds, to participate in 
some kind of education or training. Also: (1) setting out 
duties on employers to release young people for the 
equivalent of one day a week to undertake training 
elsewhere (where the employer does not provide their 
own training); (2) introducing a duty on local authorities 
to ensure that young people participate and to provide 
the support service currently known as Connexions; (3) 
requiring local authorities to assess the education and 
training needs of young people aged 16−19 with special 
educational needs; (4) requiring the Learning and Skills 
Council to secure the proper provision of courses for 
learners over the age of 19. 
2008 
Active labour market policies 
Training 




The National Apprenticeship Service (NAS) was 
established as a single body responsible for the end to 
end delivery of Apprenticeships across England. It 
makes it as easy as possible for employers to take on 
apprentices, streamlining the application process, 
coordinates funding and offering support and advice at 
every step for both the employer and learner. Its services 
include: Employer Services; Learner Services; and a 
web-based vacancy matching system (Apprenticeship 
vacancies). It took over the running of the 
apprenticeship programme from the Learning and Skills 
Council. 
2009 
Active labour market policies 
Direct job creation schemes 
Funding work-focused volunteering 




8m GBP funding for work-focused volunteering 
opportunities for those unemployed more than six 
months and guaranteed job or work-focused training 
place for all 18−24 year olds before reaching 12 months 
of unemployment (after 6 months since 2010, part of the 
6 month offer). Target was 40.000 volunteers in 2 years, 
delivery was significantly less. 
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2009 
Active labour market policies 
Employment subsidies 
Six months subsidies for employers of 
the young - Future Jobs Fund 
Source: LABREF 
Coding: 4
The Future Jobs Fund (FJF) provided funding – paying 
wages and other business costs up to £6,500 per person 
– for approved bids from organisations or consortia 
(usually led by local councils) that offered jobs lasting at 
least 6 months, involved working at least 25 hours a 
week and paid at least the National Minimum Wage. The 
FJF was the main part of the Young Person’s Guarantee 
where 18–24-year-olds reaching the six-month point of 
their Jobseeker’s Allowance claim were guaranteed an 
offer of a job, training or work experience. 
2009 
Active labour market policies 
Employment subsidies 
Subsidies for employment of the young 
in the care sector - Care First Careers 
Source: LABREF 
Coding: 4
Care First Careers is a joint Department of Health and 
Department for Work and Pensions recruitment initiative 
to get more young people into the adult social care 
sector, introduced nationally on 25th January 2010. 
Employers receive a £1,000 subsidy to employ for at 
least six months an 18- to 24-year-old who has been out 
for work for six months or longer. The recruit would 
also receive free pre-employment training. 
2009 
Active labour market policies 
Special schemes for youth 
Apprenticeship Grants for Employers 
Source: LABREF 
Coding: 1
The Apprenticeship Grant for Employers (AGE) 
programme was designed to stimulate the formation of 
new Apprenticeships for young unemployed people aged 
16 or 17. Employers were offered a grant of £2,500, 
payable in two instalments – of £1,500 on the 
Apprentice’s start on programme and £1,000 after 12 
weeks. Target was 5,000 Apprenticeship places and a 
cut-off date of March 31st 2010 for applications. 
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2009 
Active labour market policies 
Special schemes for youth 
Better skills, apprenticeships - White 
paper on skills for growth 
Source: LABREF   
Coding: 1
White paper on Skills for growth: 1) building a ‘modern 
class of technicians’, with an overarching ambition that 
three quarters of people should participate in higher 
education or complete an advanced apprenticeship or 
equivalent technician level course by the age of 30; 2) 
doubling the number of advanced apprenticeships to 
35,000 places over the next two years, with additional 
funding for advanced (level 3) and higher (level 4) 
apprenticeships of GBP 17 million (€19.1 million as at 
14 January 2010) in 2010–2011 and GBP 115 million 
(€129.1 million) by 2014–2015; 3) supporting 
apprentices to progress to higher education through the 
introduction of a new Apprenticeship Scholarships Fund, 
offering bursaries of up to GBP 1,000 (€1,123); 4) 
developing a new network of University Technical 
Colleges for young persons aged 14–19 years; 5) 
empowering learner choice as a means of enhancing 
provider performance through the use of an updated 
version of new ‘Skills Accounts’; 6) introducing lighter 
touch monitoring arrangements for providers that 
perform well; 7) simplifying the skills system by 
supporting the UKCES recommendation that the number 
of skills and funding agencies should be reduced by over 
30 bodies within the next three years, including new 
plans for a ‘substantial reduction’ in the number of 
Sector Skills Councils. 
2009 
Active labour market policies 
Special schemes for youth 




The Community Task Force was part of the Department 
for Work & Pensions Young Person's Guarantee and 
helped young jobseekers aged 18–24, by giving them up 
to 6 months of work experience. Work placements often 
provided environmental, economic and social benefits to 
their community, for example including such roles as 
land management workers, gardeners and recycling 
workers. 
2011 
Active labour market policies 
Public Employment Services (job 
assistance, job-counselling etc.) 
The New Enterprise Allowance (NEA) 
to encourage self-employment 
Source: LABREF 
Coding: 6
A new scheme to encourage self employment has been 
launched by the government. The New Enterprise 
Allowance (NEA) is open to those aged 18 and over 
receiving Jobseeker’s Allowance (JSA) with the 
following features: 1) access to a business mentor to 
provide guidance and support 2) can stop claiming JSA 
and switch to a weekly allowance for up to 26 weeks to 
a total amount of GBP1,274 (paid at a similar level to 
the basic JSA of GBP65 per week for the first three 
months, before falling to GBP33 for the remaining three 
months) 3) Claimants becoming self employed may be 
eligible for a loan of up to GBP1,000 to help with 
business start-up costs. 
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2011 
Active labour market policies 
Public Employment Services (job 
assistance, job-counselling etc.) 
Additional adviser contact to help a 
young person focus on getting into a job 
or education or training 
Source: LABREF 
Coding: 3
To fight youth unemployment: Provide job search 
support for 16–17-year-olds on JSA by making adviser 
support available to these claimants; Additional adviser 
contact to help a young person focus on getting into a 
job or education or training; Extra time for advisers to 
help clients amounting to one hour at the front end of a 
claim and an extra five minutes per week while on 
benefit; At least fortnightly reviews between the 
claimant and adviser or more frequently if this is 
deemed necessary; Attendance at reviews and interviews 
will be mandatory for the claimant with the prospect of 
sanctions for those on JSA in the event of non 
compliance; JCP advisers will work closely with local 
authorities (who currently have front line responsibility 
for 16–17-year-olds). 
2011 
Active labour market policies 
Special schemes for youth 
Youth Contract: half a million new 
opportunities for young people 
Source: LABREF 
Coding: 1 + 2 + 3 + 4
Youth Contract: half a million new opportunities for 
young people in a long list of measures, the key ones of 
which are summarised as follows: 1) Cash payments to 
encourage employers to recruit young people – 160,000 
job subsidies worth up to GBP2,275 2) An extra 250,000 
Work Experience places over the next three years taking 
the total to at least 100,000 places per year – an offer of 
a Work Experience place will be made to every 18–24-
year-old before he or she enters the Work Programme 
(acceptance appears to be voluntary); 3) At least 20,000 
extra incentive payments with GBP1,500 each for 
employers to take on young people as apprentices; 
4)Extra support through Jobcentre Plus in the form of 
weekly, rather than fortnightly, signing-on meetings. 5) 
In addition the government announced special help for 
‘the most vulnerable’ 16–17-year-olds not in 
employment, education or training (NEET) to get them 
back into education, an apprenticeship or a job with 
training (at a total cost of GBP150m). 
2011 
Active labour market policies 




Education Act 2011:  apprenticeship offers + Securing 




Active labour market policies 
Training 
New skills strategy 
Source: LABREF   
Coding: 1
Skills for Sustainable Growth: It outlines the coalition’s 
plans to address ‘current failings’ in England’s further 
education and training system. One of the main aims is 
to create an additional 75,000 adult apprenticeship 
places on top of the previous Labour government’s plans 
with 200,000 adults expected to start an apprenticeship 
by 2014–2015. The government will pay GBP 250 
million (€295 million as of 15 December 2010) towards 
this over the spending review period. There will also be 
a focus on making level 3 apprenticeships (A-level 
equivalent) the level ‘to which learners and employers 
aspire’. 
2012 
Active labour market policies 
Special schemes for youth 




After fierce opposition by trade unions but also a group 
of main employers, on 29 February 2012, the 
government met employers to hear their concerns about 
the scheme. After the meeting, it announced that the 
threat of removing benefits from people who leave 
placements would be dropped. The government stated 
that benefit sanctions would apply only in cases of gross 
misconduct. It also said that only 220 people had been 
sanctioned since the scheme started, and that many 
employers were still joining the programme. 
2012 
Active labour market policies 
Special schemes for youth 
Youth Contract initiative 
Source: LABREF 
Coding: NOT CODED (identical to 
other measure)
The Youth Contract, launched in April 2012, is a 
package of support to help young unemployed people 
prepare for work and find long term sustainable 
employment. Provision under the Youth Contract 
includes: 1) wage incentives worth up to £2,275 each for 
employers who recruit an 18 to 24 year old who has 
been on benefit 6 months or more from Jobcentre Plus 
or through the Work Programme; 2) an extra 250,000 
work experience places or places in sector-based work 
academies over 3 years, taking the total to at least 
100,000 a year; 3)  a further 20,000 incentive payments 
to encourage employers to take on young Apprentices, 
taking the total number to 40,000 in 2012–13; 4)  
additional support through Jobcentre Plus by way of 
more adviser time and more frequent attendance; 5) an 
opportunity to be referred for a careers interview with 
the National Careers Service 3.63. As part of the Youth 
Contract, the government is investing £150 million over 
3 years (£126 million of it in England) to support the 
most disengaged and disadvantaged 16–17-year-olds. 
This provides support to help them to get back into 
education, an apprenticeship or a job with training. 
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2012 
Active labour market policies 
Special schemes for youth 




A pilot project was launched in London in August 2012 
(to start in the autumn) aimed at helping young people 
aged 18-24 claiming income-based JSA who have not 
previously  completed at least six months of paid work. 
There is a requirement that they must undertake work 
experience to help better prepare them for the labour 
market. The work experience will involve at least 30 
hours per week for 13 weeks and it is envisaged that 
placements will have a strong community focus and so 
will mainly be in charities, social enterprises and the 
voluntary sector. In addition there will be ongoing 
support from contracted providers in job search. It is 
anticipated that around 6,000 young people across the 16 
London boroughs will take part in the pilot. The pilot is 
funded under the DWP Youth Contract and with 
additional funds from the ESF. 
2012 
Active labour market policies 
Special schemes for youth 
Apprenticeship Grant for Employers 
Source: LABREF 
Coding: 1
Apprenticeship Grant for Employers (AGE) for SMEs 
recruiting those aged 16-24 years old was extended to 
December 2014. AGE provides grants of £1,500 to 
employers with up to 1,000 employees recruiting 16 to 
24 year olds, to encourage them to develop their 
business and take on new apprentices. The £1,500 is in 
addition to the training costs of the Apprenticeship 
Framework which are met in full for young people aged 
16 to 18, and 50% for those aged 19 to 24. In July 2013, 
it was extended to December 2014. 
2013 
Active labour market policies 
Special schemes for youth 




Following the Richard Review of apprenticeships in 
2012, this new approach is an attempt to raise the quality 
of apprenticeships by making them more closely allied 
to what employers need in terms of skills. The plans 
include the following: 1) Employers putting recognised 
and meaningful industry standards at the heart of every 
apprenticeship. 2) Every apprenticeship should be 
targeted at a skilled job, involving substantial new 
learning that will provide the foundations for a career 
and a springboard for progression. 3) Training and 
accreditation of existing workers who are already fully 
competent in their jobs should be delivered separately. 
4) Apprenticeships should be focused on the outcome, 
clearly setting out what apprentices should know and be 
able to do at the end of their apprenticeship. 5) 
Apprenticeships will move to a final holistic test which 
has the full confidence of employers. All apprentices 
will work towards a Level 2 qualification either through 
GCSEs or functional skills in English and maths from 
August 2014 if they have not already achieved this. 
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2013 
Active labour market policies 
Special schemes for youth 
New Traineeship programme 
Source: LABREF 
Coding: 2 
New traineeship programme: initial proposals for the 
development of a new programme of traineeships to 
help young people to prepare for and secure 
apprenticeships and other sustainable employment.
2015 
Active labour market policies 
Special schemes for youth 
Introduction of the Youth Obligation to 




Youth Obligation for most 18 to 21 year olds claiming 
benefits. From the start of Universal Credit claims, 18 to 
21 year olds will participate in an intensive period of 
support, learning, job-search and interview techniques 
and doing structured work preparation. Tailored, flexible 
support will be provided to those in work, but need to 
increase their earnings. After 6 months, young people 
still claiming Universal Credit will be expected to apply 
for an apprenticeship, a traineeship, gain work-based 
skills valued by employers, or go on a work placement 
to give them the skills they need to get on in work. 
2015 
Active labour market policies 
Training  




The government announced an extension to the 
Apprenticeship Grant for Employer until the end of the 
2016–2017 academic year.
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Supplementary unemployment benefits can be received 
for 30 weeks within 104 weeks. The adjustment shall 
create increased transition from part-time work to full-
time work by ensuring sufficient incentives with 
employers and employees. Previously, part-time 
employees with terms of notice were eligible for part-time 
unemployment benefits for 50 weeks within a period of 
70 weeks and those without terms of notice were eligible 
for part-time unemployment benefits for 4 years within a 
period of 6 years.  
The adjustment is expected to have an employment effect 
of 1,700 full-time persons. 
2008 
Unemployment benefits 
Search and job availability 
requirements  




Widening the scope of activation measures and changing 
the enforcement of availability criteria. Previously, the 
rules concerning availability to work were enforced by 
requiring 4 job applications per week per unemployed. 
Now: 1) Immediately after a person has become 
unemployed, the unemployment insurance benefit fund is 
obliged to explain what the availability rules mean to the 
unemployed. 2) When the unemployed comes to the first 
meeting a job search plan is made for the next 3 months; 
3) The right-and-duty to participate in ALMP (principle of 
mutual obligations) will take place after 3 months rather 
than 6 months of unemployed for all unemployed under 
30 years and will be simplified with respect to what offers 
various target groups should receive. 
2009 
Unemployment benefits 
Search and job availability 
requirements 
Stricter rules on compulsory activation 
for young unemployed 
Source: LABREF 
Coding: 3 
All unemployed below the age of 30 will be required to 
take their first job interview within one month of 
unemployment instead of after three months and 
compulsory activation starts after 3 months. Formerly, 
compulsory activation set in after 6 months for those 




Coverage and eligibility conditions  
Strengthening eligibility conditions  
Source: LABREF 
Coding: 2 
Conditions for regaining the right to unemployment 
benefits will be harmonised with the rules for qualifying 
for benefits, in the first place. In both case, criteria is 52 
weeks of full-time employment during the previous 3 
years, up from 26 weeks in 3 years.
2010 
Unemployment benefits 
Duration of unemployment benefits 
Limitation of the maximum period 




Maximum period is 2 out of the last 3 years – half the 
earlier '4 out of 6' years.
2011 
Unemployment benefits 
Duration of unemployment benefits 
Half year extension of unemployment 
benefits for those who exhaust their 
benefits in the second half of 2012 
Source: LABREF 
Coding: 1 
The duration of unemployment benefits for insured 
unemployed will be extended by half a year for all 
unemployed, who will exhaust their unemployment 
benefits in the second half of 2012, except that the total 
benefit period cannot exceed 4 years. This element acts 
against the shortening of the benefit period from four to 




Net replacement rate  
Temporary labour market benefit for 
those who have expired benefits 
Source: LABREF 
Coding: 1
A new temporary so-called “labour market benefit” will 
be introduced from January 1, 2014. The benefit will be 
given to all unemployed, who exhaust their right to 
unemployment benefits and/or the educational allowance 
after January 1, 2014. The duration of the labour market 
benefit will be gradually reduced towards the second half 
of 2016, where the two-year benefit period will then be 
fully implemented. The total duration of unemployment 
benefits and the two new benefits cannot exceed four 
years. The main strength of the reform is therefore that the 
number of unemployed losing the right to benefits will be 
more evenly distributed over the period 2013-2016. The 
reform is to be financed through a wide range of minor 
savings on the public budget. The related legislation went 




Duration of unemployment benefits 
Introduction of temporary labour 
market cash benefits 
Source: LABREF 
Coding: 1
A new type of benefit has been introduced: temporary 
labour market cash benefits. These benefits are granted to 
persons who from 2015 will exhaust their right to 
unemployment benefits, and the temporary labour market 
benefits and who are denied full cash benefits. The total 
period of unemployment benefits, temporary labour 
market benefits and temporary labour market cash 
benefits may not exceed 3 years. Temporary labour 
market cash benefits are independent of spouse's income 
and total family wealth. 
2015 
Unemployment benefits 
Duration of unemployment benefits 
Increase of flexibility and generosity 
for those wiling to work 
Source: LABREF 
Coding: 3
The main purpose of this reform is to strengthen the 
incentive to take on all types of employment during the 
unemployment benefit period. The reform consists of the 
following main elements: (1) Introduction of the 
employment account which allows a flexible 
accumulation of rights to unemployment benefits. This 
implies that employment during the unemployment 
benefit period increases the period that an individual is 
entitled to benefits. (2) Extension of the period is 
calculated at the ratio 1:2; i.e., one day’s work may be 
converted into two days’ extension of the period that an 
individual is entitled to benefits. However, the extension 
period cannot exceed one year. (3) A waiting day is 
introduced every four months for persons with a high 
unemployment rate corresponding to three waiting days 
per year for full-time unemployed. The waiting day may 
be avoided if, during a period of four months, the person 
has had employment corresponding to more than 20 days 
of full employment. This should promote the incentive to 
take on all types of employment. 
2015 
Unemployment benefits 
Net replacement rates for specific 
groups of graduates 
Source LABREF 
Coding: 2 
The main purpose of this reform is made more flexible 
and generous for those showing willingness to work (see 
other entry). However, for graduates the system will 
become less generous. Graduates will receive 82% of the 
maximum unemployment benefit for breadwinners and 








Net replacement rate 
Unemployed who decide to become 
self-employed can draw 60% of their 
unemployment benefits at once 
Source: LABREF 
Coding: 1 
Unemployed who decide to become self-employed can 
draw 60% of their unemployment benefits at once (instead 
of the current 40%).
2009 
Unemployment benefits 
Coverage and eligibility conditions  
New unemployment benefit for those 
who have lost their unemployment 
rights 
Source: LABREF 
Coding: 3 + 1 
New €420 monthly unemployment payment to be granted 
to people who have lost their unemployment rights since 1 
January 2009. The new unemployment benefit will last a 
maximum of 180 days and will be available, in any case, up 
until 15 February 2010. The payment amount is equal to 
Spain’s current Public Indicator of Multiple Effect Income 
(IPREM). Entitlement to the benefit will be conditional on 
the unemployed person taking part in a training programme 
– this initiative will include measures such as career 
guidance, attending job interviews, training measures and 
help with writing their curriculum vitae (CV). 
2012 
Unemployment benefits 
Coverage and eligibility conditions  
Eligibility conditions for workers 
older than 50 
Source: LABREF 
Coding: 1 
The age to receive unemployment assistance for workers 
older than 50 is raised from 52 to 55 years
2012 
Unemployment benefits 
Coverage and eligibility conditions  




The wealth of the beneficiaries has a stronger role in setting 
the eligibility conditions. Eligibility for non-contributory 
unemployment benefits is limited by the level of income 
received by the potential beneficiary. Unproductive assets 
are supposed to supply income at the legal rate of interest. 
Previously only 50% of this legal interest was applied while 
now 100% is considered. Thus, eligibility criteria are more 




Duration of unemployment benefits 
Special subsidy for workers older than 
45 is repealed 
Source: LABREF 
Coding: 2
The special unemployment subsidy for workers over 45 and 




Duration of unemployment benefits 
Extension of unemployment benefits  
Source: LABREF 
Coding: 3 + 1 
Extension of unemployment benefits for six additional 
months to people involved in retraining programmes.
2012 
Unemployment benefits 
Duration of unemployment benefits 
Duration of unemployment assistance 
for older workers 
Source: LABREF 
Coding: 1 
The duration of unemployment assistance for unemployed 
people older than 55 will cover the period until they have 
access to a contributory pension of any kind.
2012 
Unemployment benefits 
Net replacement rate 
Increase in unemployment assistance  
Source: LABREF 
Coding: 1 
Unemployment assistance is raised from 75% to 80% of 





Net replacement rate  
New programme of unemployment 
assistance 
Source: LABREF 
Coding: 3 + 1
The law extends a special assistance programme for long-
term unemployed until February 2013. This programme 
was initiated in February 2011 for a period of six months, 
and has since then been extended by successive six-month 
periods. The programme includes two types of measures: 
unemployment benefits of 75% of the multiplier for the 
public income index (or 85% if the applicant is taking care 
of at least three family members) and a retraining 
programme to improve employability are provided to 
unemployed persons. 
The financial aid is increased from 399 € to 452 € for those 
long-term unemployed having at least two members of the 
family unit in charge, in addition to the spouse or partner, -
with the exception of those unemployed who have at least 
one dependent child, who are automatically entitled to ask 
support from PREPARA, independently of the time that 
they have been unemployed. 
To access this programme, the law requires regular 
unemployment benefits to have been exhausted and for 
three requirements to be met: Registration as unemployed 
for at least 12 months, family responsibilities and 
demonstration that the applicant does not receive an income 
in excess of 75% of the multiplier for the public income 
index. Compared to previous programme, the government 
has slightly increased the amount of financial aid for those 
with greater family responsibilities, and has included 
special requirements for unemployed persons who reside 
with others and who have an income or revenue.  
Those who receive these benefits are required to participate 
in professional development activities and in job search. A 
breach of these duties entails the loss of support. 
The law also increase collaboration and coordination of the 
State with the Autonomous Communities. 
2012 
Unemployment benefits 
Net replacement rate 
Steepening of the unemployment 
benefit over the unemployment spell 
Source: LABREF 
Coding: 2 
After 180 days of unemployment gross benefits are reduced 




Search and job availability 
requirements  
Tightened job-search conditionalities 
for the active income for job insertion 
Source: LABREF 
Coding: 3 
To be eligible for the Active Income for job insertion 
(Renta activa de insercion), benefit recipients must: a) 
actively search for a job for at least 12 months; b) not have 
rejected an adequate job offer, training or other measure to 
improve their employability (any interruption would 
require a full period of 12 months); c) have previously 








Active job search and proof of job-search activities is an 
obligation of unemployment benefit recipients. 
Responsibility is given to regional authorities. Participation 




Coverage and eligibility conditions  
Reduction of the contribution period 
for unemployed in agriculture 
Source: LABREF 
Coding: 1 
Temporary reduction of the contribution period required by 
Social Security to access a special unemployment subsidy 
in the agricultural sector (due to lack of employment).
2013 
Unemployment benefits 
Coverage and eligibility conditions 
Measures to support self-employment 
of young people  
Source: LABREF 
Coding: 1
To promote the self-employment of young people (i.e., the 
start of activities on their own or the launch of a business or 
a company), Act 11/2013 implements several measures. 
These are measures that usually represent cost savings for 
people who establish a business or a profession (especially 
social security costs), but in some cases, they also have the 
potential to obtain financial resources from public 
administration. Compatibility between the unemployment 
benefits and the performance of a self-employment activity 
for a maximum of 270 days, right to immediate access to 
full unemployment benefits to make investments in the new 
activity, the possibility of interrupting receipt of 
unemployment benefits for a period of 60 months to 
conduct a self-employment activity, and the voluntary 
payment of social security contributions in case of accident 
at work. The unemployment benefits received immediately 
under the conditions described above are fully tax-free. 
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Table S6 – Reforms to unemployment benefits in the United Kingdom (2008-2015) 
2013 
Unemployment benefits 
Duration of unemployment benefits  
Extension of unemployment benefits 
with mandatory participation in 
retraining  
Source: LABREF 
Coding: 3 + 1
Extending the retraining programme for the unemployed. It 
was introduced in 2011 in light of the growing 
unemployment rate and the increased number of people 
who stopped receiving unemployment benefits because 
they had reached their maximum term. The programme has 
already been extended four times (for successive periods of 
six months). An automatic renewal every six months has 
now been agreed, as the unemployment rate in Spain is 
expected to remain above 20%. The programme combines 
the granting of a special benefit to long-term unemployed 
who have exhausted their regular benefits (and who do not 
earn an income above a specific limit) with mandatory 
participation of such persons in retraining activities which 
will help them find a new job. 
2015 
Unemployment benefits 
Coverage and eligibility conditions  
Introduction of compatibility between 
unemployment benefits and income 
from self-employment or 
incorporation of the unemployed 




This Act foresees compatibility between unemployment 
benefits and the income from self-employment in case of 
workers who launch an autonomous activity (up to 9 
months). This measure can also apply to the incorporation 
of the unemployed person into a cooperative or a worker-
owned company. The Act also extends the traditional 
possibility of receiving all accrued unemployment benefits 
in a single payment if that amount is used to launching an 
autonomous activity (an operation known as 
"capitalisation") to all unemployed (before, only up to 60% 
for adult unemployed).  Lastly, a self-employed who has to 
interrupt his/her activity for economic reasons, who is 
entitled to the cease of activity benefit and who was entitled 
before the entrepreneurship project to contributory 
unemployment benefits can now choose to restart the 
remaining unemployment benefit or to receive the cease of 
activity benefit. Interestingly, s/he can do so up to five 
years after the beginning of the self-employment initiative 




Search and job availability 
requirements  
Activation measures for lone parents  
Source: LABREF  
Coding: 3
Since 2008, lone parents who are able to work and whose 
youngest child is 12 years old or over are required to actively 
seek work, with support including national rollout of in-work 
credit. Those with a youngest child aged 10 or over will 
follow from October 2009 and those with a youngest child 




Coverage and eligibility conditions  
Simpler benefit system – Welfare 
Reform Bill 2009 
Source: LABREF 
Coding: 4
Reform of the welfare and benefit system to improve support 
and incentives for people to move from benefits to work.  
Abolishing the Income Support (IS), by moving IS claimants 
who are ready for work into Job Seeker's Allowance or into 
Employment and Support Allowance where appropriate. The 
reform thus introduces a simpler benefit system with just 2 
benefit types available: the Employment Support Allowance 
will take-in many of those currently on IS, while the existing 
Jobseeker's Allowance will encompass those considered job 
ready who are currently on other benefits. 
2012 
Unemployment benefits 
Search and job availability 
requirements 
More stringent rules for jobseeker’s 
allowance to comply  
Source: LABREF 
Coding: 3
From the 22nd October 2012 more stringent rules have been 
applied to the receipt of Jobseeker’s Allowance (JSA) for 
those who fail to comply with the rules. Prior to the change, 
those JSA recipients who were deemed to refuse a job offer 
or in some other way contravene the benefit rules, were 
liable to lose their benefit entitlement for up to three months. 
Under the new rules this has been extended to a possible 
maximum of three years, though tiered as follows: 1) low 
level – for failures to undertake a specific action as required 
by a JCP adviser the sanction will be one month for a first 
and three months for a second and subsequent failures; 2) 
Intermediate level – for failures to actively seek and be 
available for work, leading to disentitlement to JSA and if a 
new claim is made, then no benefit is payable for up to one 
month for the first failure and three months for the second 
and subsequent failure; 3) High level – for failures to comply 
with the most important job seeking requirements such as 
refusing to accept a reasonable job offer ot leaving a job 
voluntarily without good reason. Here the sanctions will be 
for a fixed period that will increase for those with a history 
of such failure to comply with three months for a first failure, 
rising to six months for a second failure and three years for a 
third. Note that the JSA will be gradually replaced by the 
Universal credit, which also has stricter conditionality. 
2013 
Unemployment benefits 
Search and job availability 
requirements  




The Claimant Commitment will be rolled out in the Autumn 
of 2013 and will focus on using a new form of the 
Jobseeker‘s Agreement that will set out more fully the 
requirements for continued receipt of benefits. This will 
include a personal statement developed and agreed between 
client and adviser with expected tasks set out, along with 
more regular monitoring and adjustment. Ultimately the 
agreement will be enforced with the threat of benefit 
sanctions and follows the introduction in 2012 of a more 




Coverage and eligibility conditions  
Restrictions on EEA nationals 
entitlements for universal credit 
Source: LABREF 
Coding: 2
The regulations provide that an EEA national whose  
only right to reside is as an EEA jobseeker, or a family 
member of such a person, cannot satisfy the Habitual 
Residence Test and will not be entitled to Universal Credit. 
This policy is meant to protect the integrity of the benefit 
system and to ensure that any available benefit support is 
increasingly focused only on mobile EEA nationals who 
contribute to the UK through work. 
2015 
Unemployment benefits 
Search and job availability 
requirements 
More requirements for claimants of 
the jobseeker allowance 
Source: LABREF 
Coding: 3
Jobseeker’s Allowance claimants, and those claiming the 
equivalent in Universal Credit are now required to do more 
for their benefit. Half of all claimants are required to attend 
the Jobcentre weekly rather than fortnightly, and the 
government announced in Spending Review and Autumn 
Statement 2015 that, from October 2016, all new claimants 
will be required to attend the Jobcentre weekly at the start of 
their claim. 
